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PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE NEED FOR
GREATER TRANSPARENCY: PRIVATE
PRISON INFORMATION ACT
ABSTRACT
Private prisons are not subject to the same regulations as government
prisons. Particularly, private prisons are exempt from the requirements set
forth in the Freedom of Information Act and its state equivalents, which
provide that the public has an enforceable right to request certain records
from government agencies. Numerous efforts made by members of Congress
to enact the Private Prison Information Act, a bill that would subject private
prisons to disclosure laws found in the Freedom of Information Act, have
been unsuccessful. Such efforts to strip the veil of secrecy that shades private
prisons from public scrutiny are especially important because in recent years
a great deal of corruption allegations and reports of unacceptable private
prison conditions have come to light. As a result, in the summer of 2016,
Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates instructed the Bureau of Prisons to
begin winding down its operations with private prisons, ultimately seeking to
end all federal outsourcing of correctional services. Immediately after the
announcement of this phase-out, shares of private prison corporations
plummeted and the industry fell into disarray. This Note explains that with
the 2016 election of President Donald Trump, and the new administration’s
rescinding of the phase-out order, private prison corporations are allotted
time to face the explicit need for transparency. This Note suggests that
through the enactment of the Private Prison Information Act, and the
subsequent allowance of greater transparency within the industry, private
prisons can embrace the demand for public oversight. Such oversight would
create a method through which the industry can improve its practices by
becoming more accountable and efficient corporations. By doing so, the
industry can strengthen its core, improve public relations, and ensure that it
will continue to thrive beyond the Trump administration.
INTRODUCTION
The United States is very good at putting people behind bars. So good,
in fact, that at any given point it has more people in prison than China, whose
population is five times greater than that of the United States. 1 The prison
population increased so rapidly during the 1980s 2 that the government could

1. Vicky Pelaez, The Prison Industry in the United States: Big Business or a New Form of
Slavery?, GLOBAL RES. (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-prison-industry-in-theunited-states-big-business-or-a-new-form-of-slavery/8289.
2. See Pamela Engel, Watch How Quickly the War on Drugs Changed America’s Prison
Population, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 23, 2014, 1:19 PM), www.businessinsider.com/how-the-war-on-dr
ugs-changed-americas-prison-population-2014-4.
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not keep up with the growing demand for more correctional facilities. 3 In
1983, as a result of supply and demand, the first modern day for-profit private
prison corporation, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), was
formed. 4 Since its creation, both private 5 and government entities 6 have
conducted investigations into the questionable conditions found in these
private institutions. The years that followed proved to be a troubling time for
the private prison industry.
On June 23, 2016, Mother Jones, an independent news organization,
published an investigatory report that revealed troubling conditions in a
facility run by CCA. 7 On August 8, 2016, the Office of the Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), confirmed the revelation of unsettling
conditions which inmates and staff have been subject to in private prisons. 8
A mere 10 days later, the DOJ, under the Obama administration, announced
that the federal government would begin a phase-out process to end federal
outsourcing to private prisons. 9 Specifically, Deputy Attorney General Sally
Yates instructed the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to either decline to renew
expiring contracts or “substantially reduce [the contract’s] scope.” 10 The
ultimate goal, explained Deputy Attorney General Yates, was to completely
end federal use of privately operated prisons. 11 Because the DOJ cannot
instruct state and local governments on whether they may engage correctional
services offered by private prisons, this phase-out would have only affected
a portion of the private prison industry: fourteen private prison facilities with
a capacity of 27,000 beds. 12 While the phase-out was reversed by the Trump

3. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 16
(2001).
4. See Madison Pauly, A Brief History of America’s Private Prison Industry, MOTHER JONES
(July/Aug. 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/history-of-americas-private-priso
n-industry-timeline; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 3, at 1 (highlighting that
prison overcrowding has been the “major catalyst for privatizing correctional facilities”).
5. See generally Shane Bauer, My Four Months as a Private Prison Guard, MOTHER JONES
(June 23, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/cca-private-prisons-correctionscorporation-inmates-investigation-bauer (journalist secures employment with one of CCA’s
facilities and reports from within).
6. See generally Pauly, supra note 4 (listing investigations by The Justice Department and the
FBI).
7. See generally Bauer, supra note 5.
8. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS’
MONITORING OF CONTRACT PRISONS (Aug. 2016) [hereinafter MONITORING OF CONTRACT
PRISONS].
9. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates to the Acting Director,
Federal Bureau of Prisons (Aug. 18, 2016) [hereinafter Memorandum for the Acting Director].
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 3, at 4 (the BOP only outsources to 14
private prisons which have a maximum bed capacity of 27,000); see also MONITORING OF
CONTRACT PRISONS, supra note 8, at 5.
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administration, 13 it remains powerful foreshadowing of what is to come
should private prisons head down the same questionable path. Now, the
private prison industry has what is left of the Trump administration to
undergo a transformation and face any allegations brought forth in wellpublicized investigatory reports, or risk a similar phase-out by the next
administration or by state governments.
This Note argues that the private prison industry should embrace the
Private Prison Information Act (PPIA), which, if passed, would subject the
industry to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This Note suggests that
by increasing transparency of private prison operations through disclosure
and independent oversight, both governmental confidence and the public’s
opinion of private prisons can be rehabilitated. Transparency can also help
the industry tackle negative press and prevent another phase-out initiative.
After all, openness and transparency are the key ingredients to building
requisite trust for the proper functioning of free market economies. 14 Should
the industry continue to resist the obvious need for transparency, the negative
perception of the private prisons will continue to grow, forcing other industry
clients to follow in the footsteps of the Obama administration’s DOJ.
Part I of this Note explores how the modern private prison industry was
formed, introduces the three main private prison corporations—CCA, 15 The
GEO Group, and the Management & Training Corporation—and explains
what encouraged the DOJ to begin the phase-out. Part II discusses how
federal entities such as the DOJ and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement apply FOIA, and explains its lack of control over private
prisons. Part III presents the history and intention behind the PPIA, elaborates
on the opposition the Act has faced, and advocates for the PPIA’s adoption.
Part IV explores the benefits of enacting the PPIA, in that the Act would
facilitate greater transparency, allow for independent oversight, improve
public relations, and prevent the next administration, or state governments,
from following in the footsteps of the Obama administration DOJ’s phaseout order.

13. See Eric Lichtblau, Justice Department Keeps For-Profit Prisons, Scrapping an Obama
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/us/politics/justicedepartment-private-prisons.html (Trump administration “directed federal prison officials to keep
using the private prisons,” explicitly withdrawing from the phase-out initiative established by the
Obama administration).
14. See Angel Gurría, Openness and Transparency - Pillars for Democracy, Trust and Progress,
L’ORGANISATION DE COOPÉRATION ET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUES, www.oecd.org/fr/et
atsunis/opennessandtransparency-pillarsfordemocracytrustandprogress.htm (last visited Sept. 23,
2017).
15. In October 2016, Corrections Corporation of America rebranded as CoreCivic. Because the
sources found herein refer to CoreCivic by its former name, and because the corporation is still
transitioning from Corrections Corporation of America to CoreCivic, this Note refers to the
corporation as Corrections Corporation of America (CCA).
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I. MODERN DAY PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY: HISTORY AND
MAIN ACTORS
Privately managed correctional services are not new in the United States.
In fact, private sector involvement in correctional services can be traced back
as far as 1607, when the first English colonists arrived in Virginia. 16 Then,
convicted felons were transported by private entities to America to be sold
into servitude as a condition of pardon. 17 The 1850s saw the first correctional
facility constructed and operated by a private actor in the United States. 18
Even at that time, private prison entities asserted their ability to manage
correctional facilities better than the government, and to produce both
superior rehabilitative results as well as financial advantages. 19
The prison population skyrocketed in the 1980s, 20 a time when the war
on drugs became more aggressive and many states began to mandate that
prisoners serve at least 85% of their terms. 21 Since the late 1980s, the DOJ’s
BOP inmate population increased by 400%. 22 By 2011, federal prisons were
39% over capacity, a number the BOP has predicted will continue to
increase. 23 State prisons were similarly overwhelmed with the growing
prison population. At the end of 2013, Illinois was 151% of capacity, North
Dakota was 150% of capacity, and Nebraska, Ohio, Delaware, Colorado,
Iowa, and Hawaii were all at least 110% of capacity. 24 Both federal and state
governments were not able to keep up with the steep rise in the prison
population and the subsequent overcrowding.
The Supreme Court addressed prison overcrowding in Brown v. Plata by
ruling that prison overcrowding violates prisoners’ Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment because, after all, even
“prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons.” 25
Prison overcrowding has been deemed by the DOJ’s Bureau of Justice
Assistance to be “one of the most burdensome problems plaguing our
criminal justice system and a major catalyst for privatizing correctional
facilities.” 26 As a result of the government’s inability to keep up with the
16.
17.
18.
19.

See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 3, at 9.
See id. at 9.
See id. at 10.
See id. at 10, 16 (modern day representatives of private prisons also claim that they are more
cost efficient than prisons run by the government).
20. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1 (2015).
21. See Bauer, supra note 5.
22. BUREAU OF PRISONS, GROWING INMATE CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES,
STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 1 (Sept. 2012).
23. See id. at 2 (the BOP is 39% over its rated capacity—the number of prisoners the BOP can
safely house).
24. See Reid Wilson, Prisons in These 17 States Are Over Capacity, WASH. POST (Sept. 20,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/20/prisons-in-these-17-statesare-filled-over-capacity/.
25. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011).
26. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 3, at 1.
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demand and the costs related to an overpopulated prison system, it turned to
outsourcing correctional services to private, corporate entities. 27
Outsourcing promised two things—to alleviate the pressure caused by a
lack of physical infrastructure necessary to house the growing prison
population, and to save the government money. 28 For example, in its 2015
10-K form, The GEO Group wrote that its “continuum of care” results in “a
higher quality of care for offenders, reduces recidivism, [and] lowers overall
costs for [] clients.” 29 Private prisons may be able to raise infrastructure faster
than the government since private actors are not constrained by lengthy
bureaucratic procedures, but it is debatable whether private prisons save
taxpayers money. Some studies confirm that private prisons are more cost
effective than government prisons, while others suggest that private prisons
actually cost more than their government counterparts. 30 More so, researchers
indicate that the costs of private versus public prisons are not easily
comparable because of many intervening factors, including “security level
and health conditions of inmates, physical characteristics of facilities,
indirect costs, and the large number of parties typically involved in
maintaining and paying for either type of prison.” 31 For example, private
prison contracts may provide that the prison will only accept inmates with no
chronic illnesses or that the corresponding state will bear the cost of HIV
treatment. 32 One study reports that “most contracts allow private
[correctional] facilities to house lower risk and healthier—less costly—
inmates than similar public facilities.” 33 Lastly, when calculating how much
outsourcing correctional services truly costs taxpayers, two expenses are not
typically accounted for: the cost of government monitoring, and the potential
cost of increased litigation. 34 Today, regardless of whether the government
saves money by outsourcing, the private prison industry is still alive and
well. 35
Since the formation of the modern prison industry, until its recent
decline, the number of inmates housed in private facilities has enjoyed a
steady growth. 36 In 2014, of the 1.6 million inmates incarcerated in the
27. See Bauer, supra note 5.
28. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 3, at 15.
29. The GEO Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 8 (Feb. 26, 2016) [hereinafter GEO

Group Form 10-K].
30. See Christopher Hartney & Caroline Glesmann, Prison Bed Profiteers: How Corporations
Are Reshaping Criminal Justice in the U.S., NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQ. 8 (May 2012),
http://www.justiceacademy.org/iShare/Library-NCCD/prison-bed-profiteers.pdf.
31. Id. at 8 (internal citations omitted).
32. See Bauer, supra note 5.
33. Hartney & Glesmann, supra note 30, at 8–9.
34. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 3, at 16.
35. See Lichtblau, supra note 13; see generally Hartney & Glesmann, supra note 30.
36. Abigail Geiger, U.S. Private Prison Population Has Declined in Recent Years, PEW RES.
CTR. (Apr. 11, 2017), www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/11/u-s-private-prison-populationhas-declined-in-recent-years/.
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United States, 131,000 were housed in private prison facilities, 37 which
amounts to about 8% of the country’s total prison population. In August
2016, the Obama-era DOJ announced that it would not be renewing contracts
with private prisons, ultimately seeking to completely phase-out correctional
outsourcing. 38
Is this the beginning of the end for the private prison industry? It does
not have to be. With the new administration, the industry has at least four
years to rehabilitate confidences shared by the public and the government.
Any other phase-out will have a dramatic impact on the private prison
industry, especially the three main private prison corporations: CCA, The
GEO Group, and the Management and Training Corporation (MTC). 39
A. CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, THE GEO GROUP
AND THE MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING CORPORATION.
CCA is the largest private prison corporation in the United States. It was
founded in 1983 and received its first federal contract later that year. 40 CCA
describes itself “[a]s a full-service corrections management provider, [that]
specialize[s] in the design, construction, expansion and management of
prisons, jails and detention facilities, along with residential reentry services,
as well as inmate transportation services.” 41 The corporation prides itself on
being the first company to design, build, and operate a private prison, and the
first to manage a maximum security facility for the federal government. 42
CCA is publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), under the
trade name CXW. As of December 31, 2015, CCA had a capacity of about
88,500 beds. 43 CCA’s 10-K lists that at the end of 2015 it owned and operated
sixty-six correctional and detention facilities, 44 up from fifty-two facilities in
37. See E. ANN CARSON, PRISONERS IN 2014 1 (2015).
38. See Memorandum for the Acting Director, supra note 9.
39. See Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 34 (Feb. 25, 2016)

[hereinafter CCA 2015 Form 10-K] (“[w]e depend on a limited number of governmental customers
for a significant portion of our revenues,” the loss of such customers “could seriously harm our
financial condition and results of operations.”); see also GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29, at
33 (“[w]e depend on a limited number of governmental customers for a significant portion of our
revenues. The loss of, or a significant decrease in revenues from, these customers could seriously
harm our financial condition and results of operations.”); see also Chloe Nordquist, Justice
Department Considering No Contract Renewals for Private Prisons, Including Taft Prison, 23ABC
NEWS BAKERSFIELD (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.turnto23.com/news/local-news/justice-departm
ent-considering-no-contract-renewals-for-private-prisons-includes-taft-prison
(“MTC
is
disappointed to learn that the Department of Justice (DOJ) is planning to end the use of contract
prisons within the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) system”).
40. See The CCA Story: Our Company History, CCA, www.cca.com/our-history (last visited
Aug. 15, 2017).
41. Who We Are, CCA, www.cca.com/who-we-are (last visited Aug. 14, 2017).
42. See Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 16 (Feb. 25, 2015)
[hereinafter CCA 2014 Form 10-K].
43. CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 5.
44. See id.
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2014, 45 and managed another eleven governmental facilities in the District of
Columbia and twenty other states. 46 As of December 23, 2016, the company’s
website listed that it “currently partners with all three federal corrections
agencies (The Federal Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshals Service and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement), many states and local
municipalities.” 47 The BOP accounted for 11% of CCA’s total revenue for
the fiscal year ending on December 31, 2015, 48 a revenue that CCA will not
see if the next administration renews the phase-out initiative.
The GEO Group is CCA’s main competitor. The entity was formed in
1984, at which time it was called Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, and it
received its first contract in 1987. 49 Unlike CCA, The GEO Group’s business
is global; it has facilities in other English-speaking countries including
Australia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. 50 In 1994, the company
went public with its initial offering on NASDAQ; its current NYSE symbol
is GEO. 51 The GEO Group presently operates seventy-three facilities in the
United States, with a maximum bed capacity of 78,213. 52 The corporation
has grown exponentially in the last few decades, with annual consolidated
revenue rising from $40 million in 1991 to $1.8 billion in 2015. 53
Created in 1987, MTC is the third major private correctional service
provider. 54 MTC appears to be more on the rehabilitative end of the spectrum.
Unlike CCA and The GEO Group, which do not as actively promote
rehabilitative services, MTC’s website asserts that it has awarded tens of
thousands of certificates in rehabilitative and educational capacities. 55 MTC
currently holds about 27,000 inmates across its twenty-four facilities. 56 Out
of the three private prisons discussed, MTC is the only company that is not
publicly traded, which results in an even greater lack of transparency because
of the absence of mandated reporting that publicly traded corporations are
subject to.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See CCA 2014 Form 10-K, supra note 42, at 5.
See CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 5.
Who We Are, CCA, supra note 41.
CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 34.
The GEO Group History Timeline, THE GEO GROUP, INC., www.geogroup.com/history_tim
eline (last visited Aug. 15, 2017).
50. GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29, at 3.
51. The GEO Group History Timeline, supra note 49.
52. Our Locations, THE GEO GROUP, INC., www.geogroup.com/locations (last visited Aug. 14,
2017).
53. GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29, at 9.
54. MTC Corrections Position Statement, MGMT. & TRAINING CORP., http://www.mtctrains.co
m/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/MTC_Corrections_Position_Statement.pdf (last visited Dec. 23,
2016).
55. See MGMT. & TRAINING CORP., SOCIAL IMPACT ANNUAL REPORT (2016), http://www.mtc
trains.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MTC_Social_Impact_Report-Rev4-Fix.pdf.
56. See MGMT. & TRAINING CORP., CORPORATE OFFICE REPORT 2 (2016), www.mtctrains.com
/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/PREA_REPORT_2016.pdf [hereinafter MTC CORPORATE OFFICE
REPORT].
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Clients of all three private prisons are local and federal correctional and
detention authorities that typically pay a per diem, per body rate. 57 CCA
reports that in 2015, 51% of its total revenue came from federal correction
and detention authorities, and 42% came from its state customers. 58 The GEO
Group provides that in 2015, 45% of its total consolidated revenue came from
various agencies of the U.S. Federal Government. 59 MTC has contracts with
county, state, and federal governments for which it operates twenty-four
facilities in the United States, 60 thus a significant portion of its revenue is also
derived from a limited set of clients.
B. WHERE THE INDUSTRY WENT WRONG
Private prisons, also known as contract prisons, are operated by for-profit
entities, and as such it is no surprise that, for example, CCA’s primary
business strategy is to increase occupancy and revenue. 61 Reports have
shown that private prisons gain profit by cutting costs and implementing
“moderate reductions in staffing patterns, fringe benefits, and other laborrelated costs.” 62 Another technique used to curb costs is employing nonunion labor, which allows for the lowest benefits packages, thus saving the
industry money on staffing costs. 63 This strategy of cutting costs, while
simultaneously needing to provide adequate correctional facilities proved to
be extremely problematic. 64 After all, history has already taught us that when
prison facilities are operated by for-profit private actors they may become
“plagued by problems associated with the quest for higher earnings,”
producing “abominable” and “inhumane living conditions.” 65 Judging by the
Obama administration DOJ’s phase-out initiative and reports produced by
independent actors like Mother Jones, it is clear that the quest for higher
earnings is plaguing the modern private prison industry too.
Recently, news outlets have been clogged with bad press about the
conditions that private prison inmates and staff are subject to. Investigatory
reports from both media and government agencies have produced troubling
results, such as inadequate staffing and uninhabitable, inhumane living
conditions. The DOJ reports that private prisons have more frequent incidents
per capita of “contraband finds, assaults, uses of force, lockdowns, guilty
57. See GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29, at 102; see also CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra
note 39, at 6; see also Bauer, supra note 5 (reporting that CCA’s Winn facility receives $34 per day
per inmate); Det. Watch Network v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 215 F. Supp. 3d 256, 259
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (explaining how private prisons bill their client, the government).
58. CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 10.
59. GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29, at 23.
60. MTC CORPORATE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 56, at 1.
61. See CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 21.
62. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 3, at ix.
63. See id. at 16.
64. See generally id.; MONITORING OF CONTRACT PRISONS, supra note 8; Bauer, supra note 5.
65. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 3, at 17.
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findings on inmate discipline charges, and selected categories of grievances”
than do prisons operated by the government. 66 An FBI report found that
employees of a CCA facility in Idaho falsified records and caused the facility
to be understaffed. 67 Understaffing causes prisons to go into lockdown, a tool
that is generally intended for actual disturbances. 68 Inadequate staffing also
generates “mismanagement and lax oversight,” which leads to barbaric
treatment of prisoners. 69 Inmate healthcare is compromised because of the
lack of healthcare professionals in these facilities and corporate reluctance to
send prisoners to the hospital, even in emergencies. 70 Inmates may also face
an absence of mandated vocational programs. 71 Such shortfalls cause private
prison facilities to compromise the safety of all, inmates and staff alike. 72
More so, these conditions have caused both inmates 73 and staff 74 to

66. MONITORING OF CONTRACT PRISONS, supra note 8, at 44.
67. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Idaho, FBI Concludes Lengthy

Investigation of Corrections Corporation of America (May 22, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/contactus/field-offices/saltlakecity/news/press-releases/fbi-concludes-lengthy-investigation-ofcorrections-corporation-of-america.
68. See Bauer, supra note 5.
69. See Margaret Newkirk & William Selway, Gangs Ruled Prison as For-Profit Model Put
Blood on Floor, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2013), www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-12/gan
gs-ruled-prison-as-for-profit-model-put-blood-on-floor (reporting that a Mississippi for-profit
detention center has “turned it into a cauldron of violence, where female employees had sex with
inmates, pitted them against each other, gave them weapons and joined their gangs”); see also Emily
Le Coz, Private Prison In Mississippi Allegedly Put Inmates In ‘Barbaric’ Conditions,
HUFFINGTON POST, www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/31/private-prison-mississippi-barbaric-con
ditions-_n_3362596.html (last updated July 31, 2013) (reporting that in an MTC facility, prisoners
don’t have functional toilets and must defecate on Styrofoam trays or into trash bags, and the facility
is so infested with rats that prisoners use them as currency and keep them as pets).
70. See Seth Freed Wessler, Federal Officials Ignored Years of Internal Warnings About Deaths
at Private Prisons, THE NATION (June 15, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/federal-offic
ials-ignored-years-of-internal-warnings-about-deaths-at-private-prisons/ (reporting that at least 38
prisoners have died because of poor medical care, gravely ill prisoners were left untreated or cared
for by “low-level medical workers,” went months without seeing a doctor, and were not transferred
to hospitals when required emergency treatment); see generally Bauer, supra note 5 (reporting that
a prisoner who was told that he had fluid in his lungs did not receive proper care; describing the
limited options prisoners at CCA’s Winn facility have when it comes to seeing a medical
professional on site).
71. See Bauer, supra note 5 (reporting that vocational activities at this facility are non-existent).
72. See id. at 30 (“CCA’s Winn facility reported twice as many ‘immediate’ uses of force as the
eight other Louisiana prisons combined.”); see also GREGORY GEISLER, CORR. INST. INSPECTION
COMM. REP. ON THE INSPECTION AND EVALUATION OF THE LAKE ERIE CORR. INST. 4 (Jan. 2013)
(after CCA purchased the facility, inmate-on-inmate assault increased by 188% and inmate-on-staff
assaults went up more than 300% in a matter of two years); see also MONITORING OF CONTRACT
PRISONS, supra note 8, at 14 (“[c]ontract prisons had higher rates of assaults and use of force”).
73. See Pauly, supra note 4 (prisoners in Mississippi, for example, threw riots complaining
“about poor food, inadequate medical care, and disrespectful guards”); see also MONITORING OF
CONTRACT PRISONS, supra note 8, at 2.
74. See Alice Miranda Ollstein, This Is How Bad the Health Care Is in Private Prisons, THINK
PROGRESS (Apr. 8, 2015, 12:00 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/this-is-how-bad-the-health-care-isin-private-prisons-6657e5ae0293#.8k6ji9xvc (reporting that hundreds of nurses who work for a forprofit prison healthcare company threatened to go on strike if “company refuses to put enough
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experience such frustration that it caused rioting and even death. 75
Investigative reports and media allegations have chipped away at the BOP’s
confidence in the industry, and prompted a phase-out of correctional
outsourcing. This phase-out is an impediment to the industry’s goals, its
relationship with other clients, and is a threat to investor security.
Despite the industry’s eagerness to clear its name, it continues to deny
access to the information that is necessary to achieve its goal. Although
government-run prisons are subject to FOIA, because of their nongovernmental corporate status, private prisons are not. By attempting to pass
the Private Prison Freedom of Information Act, Congress has tried time and
again to extend FOIA to include private prison facilities. 76 Private prisons
have fought tirelessly against its enactment, presumably, because they do not
want to expose themselves to public scrutiny. 77 If FOIA is handled correctly,
and the veil of administrative secrecy is stripped away, the private prison
industry can work on healing client relationships, and restoring the
confidence once held by the public and by the government.
II. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND ITS EFFECT
ON THE PRISON SYSTEM
FOIA was enacted in 1966, after a decade of debate between agency
officials, legislators, and public representatives. 78 FOIA intended “to
overhaul the public-disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure
Act,” 79 which “was plagued with vague phrases” that became more of “a
withholding statute than a disclosure statute.” 80 FOIA provides that any
person has an enforceable right to obtain federal agency records. 81 In NLRB
v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., Justice Powell opined that “[t]he basic
purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning
of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the
governors accountable to the governed.” 82 Congress enacted FOIA “to pierce
the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of
nurses on duty and give them enough resources to adequately care for the thousands” of incarcerated
men).
75. See generally Stephanie Gallman, Guard Killed, Several Others Injured in Riot at
Mississippi Prison, Officials Say, CNN, www.cnn.com/2012/05/20/us/mississippi-prisondisturbance/ (last updated May 20, 2012) (CCA prison guard was killed while on duty during a riot;
cause of death was deemed to be blunt trauma to the head).
76. See Pauly, supra note 4.
77. See id.; see also Christie Thompson, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Private
Prisons..., THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 18, 2014, 12:26 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.o
rg/2014/12/18/everything-you-ever-wanted-to-know-about-private-prisons#.vQ4rW9rZq.
78. See generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 1, 4,
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/introduction.pdf.
79. Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011).
80. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
81. See GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, supra note 78, at 1.
82. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
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public scrutiny.” 83 FOIA provides “a means for citizens to know what their
Government is up to.” 84 It does not apply to state or local governments, but
almost every state has a local version of open record laws. 85 Pursuant to FOIA
and its state counterparts, “any person” can request records about prisons
owned and operated by the government, so long as those records are properly
requested, reasonably described, and do not fall within any of the nine listed
exemptions. 86
The nine exemptions explain what information is not subject to
disclosure under FOIA. These exemptions include, but are not limited to:
classified information that pertains to national security, trade secrets,
privileged information, information that would invade another individual’s
privacy, information compiled for law enforcement purposes such as
information that would interfere with enforcement proceedings, information
regarding the supervision of financial institutions, and the geological
information of wells. 87 The Supreme Court has recognized that, because of
the underlying reason for creating FOIA, exemptions must be “narrowly
construed.” 88 Should an agency deny a request for information, they must
justify the reason for doing so using one of the nine exemptions. 89
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency that
outsources its prison duties to private prisons, provides that “the FOIA Office
[of ICE] ensures openness and transparency to better serve those seeking
more information about ICE and its operations.” 90 The BOP’s website,
another federal entity that outsources its correctional responsibilities,
specifies that FOIA requests made to the agency follow three routes: the
simple, the complex, or the expedited track. 91 The simple and the complex
tracks vary in the type of information being asked and the way the request is
handled. Requests falling under the complex route take longer to process than
those falling under the simple track; for example, policy statements or general
information about the BOP fall into the simple track, while contract
information and information on investigations conducted by the BOP’s
83. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (quoting Rose v. Dep’t of the Air
Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974)).
84. NARA v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) (quoting DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)).
85. See generally NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNTIES, COUNTY AUTHORITY: A STATE BY STATE
REPORT (Dec. 2010).
86. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
87. Id. § 552(b)(1)–(9).
88. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (citations omitted).
89. See generally Nicole B. Cdsarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized
Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
249, 266 (1994–1995).
90. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Office, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/management-administration/foia (last visited Aug. 15, 2017).
91. See Freedom of Information Act FAQs, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/f
oia/#tabs-3 (last visited Aug. 15, 2017).
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Office of Internal Affairs follow the complex track. 92 The expedited track
allows for information to be processed faster—should the request fall into a
specifically listed situation, such as when “the subject of the request is of
widespread and exceptional media interest and the information sought
involves possible questions about the government’s integrity which affect
public confidence.” 93
CCA, The GEO Group, and MTC do not have descriptions on their
websites about how FOIA requests are handled, or any requests for
information, at all. Despite being funded by public taxpayer money, and
despite performing a task that has historically been handled by the
government, FOIA does not apply to private prisons. 94 The argument is that
private prisons are private corporations, and thus are untouchable by FOIA
requests. 95 By refusing to disclose or allow for any transparency, and instead
enforcing secrecy, the industry tarnishes its own image, exacerbates public
and government relations, and ultimately leads itself down a path where
neither the industry nor its investors ever want to be—another phase-out.
If private prisons followed a FOIA information request structure similar
to the one followed by the BOP, it is likely that any requests made when the
DOJ announced its phase-out plans would have fallen under the expedited
track. Under the expedited track, private prisons would have quickly
disclosed information necessary to either counter the allegations, or embrace
the steps the industry needs to take to provide better services. Either one of
these outcomes would have ensured that the industry was working towards
regaining public and governmental acceptance. This, however, is not what
happened. Today, the private prison industry continues to lurk in the shadows
as it hides behind its corporate veil, leaving all to wonder whether the
allegations of corruption, fraud, and unacceptable living conditions brought
forth by government and independent investigations are true.
III. PRIVATE PRISON INFORMATION ACT
Prisons that are managed by the government are subject to FOIA, while
their private counterparts are not. 96 Upon request, government-run prisons
must disclose information such as prisoner demographics, violent incidents,

92. See id.
93. Id.
94. See generally Matt Stroud, Updated: Private Prisons Are Exempted From Federal

Disclosure Laws; Advocates Say That Should Change, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://ww
w.forbes.com/sites/mattstroud/2013/02/07/private-prisons-are-exempted-from-federal-disclosurelaws-advocates-say-that-should-change/#31bbd4634d0d.
95. See Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing Transparency and Accountability to
Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 455, 475 (2011).
96. See Alex Park, Will Private Prisons Finally Be Subject to the Freedom of Information Act?,
MOTHER JONES (Dec. 16, 2014, 11:45 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2014/12/will-pri
vate-prisons-ever-be-subject-open-records-laws.
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and prison budgets. 97 This grants the public, along with prisoner advocacy
groups, the ability to oversee prison operations and hold the appropriate
agency accountable. This is also in accordance with the purpose of FOIA: to
allow for an informed citizenry that has the means to hold those that govern
accountable. 98 Advocates and opponents of the industry alike agree on the
importance of private prison accountability. 99
In an attempt to expose the inner workings of private prisons,
representatives in Congress repeatedly tried to enact the PPIA, 100 an act
aimed at expanding FOIA to include private prisons. The first attempt was
made in 2005 by Representative Ted Strickland when he introduced the Act
to the House of Representatives; at the time it was first introduced, the bill
had twenty-five cosponsors. 101 The next attempt was made on May 20, 2015
by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee to the 114th Congress, House of
Representatives. 102 The driving force behind the 2015 bill was Alex
Friedmann and Christopher Petrella of Prison Legal News (PLN). 103 This
2015 bill had twenty-eight cosponsors. 104 The summary of the bill explains
that it:
[s]ubjects records relating to the operation of and prisoners in a prison or
other correctional or detention facility that is owned or operated by a
nongovernmental entity, state, or local government and that incarcerates or
detains federal prisoners pursuant to a contract or agreement with a federal
agency to the Freedom of Information Act in the same manner as records
maintained by a federal agency operating a federal prison or detention
facility. 105

The latest action this bill encountered was on June 16, 2015, when it was
referred to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and

97. See id.
98. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (Justice Powell opined

that “[t]he basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a
democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable to the
governed.”).
99. See Cdsarez, supra note 89, at 249–50.
100. See Pauly, supra note 4.
101. See Cosponsors, H.R.1806–Private Prison Information Act of 2005, CONGRESS, https://ww
w.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/1806/cosponsors (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
102. See Private Prison Information Act of 2015, H.R. 2470, 114th Cong. (2015).
103. See E-mail from Alex Friedmann, Managing Editor, PLN and Associate Director, Human
Rights Defense Center to author (Nov. 15, 2016, 12:05 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Email from Alex Friedmann]. In response to the author’s inquiry about the PPIA, Alex Friedmann
advised that he and Christopher Petrella wrote most of the bill and were the driving force behind
the last two introductions in the House. Id.
104. See Cosponsors, H.R.2470–Private Prison Information Act of 2015, CONGRESS, https://ww
w.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2470/cosponsors (last visited Sept. 23, 2017).
105. Summary, H.R.2470–Private Prison Information Act of 2015, CONGRESS, https://www.con
gress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2470 (last visited Sept. 23, 2017).
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Investigations. 106 This bill died in that committee, as did the five PPIAs that
the House saw before it. 107 The latest version, which was introduced in 2017,
has been standing idle in the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland
Security, and Investigations since May 1, 2017. 108
The Senate encountered the bill as well. In fact, it was first introduced
over ten years ago, in 2006, by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman. 109 The Senate
last saw the Act when it was reintroduced by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin on
September 28, 2016, 110 less than two months after the DOJ initiated the
phase-out. That bill’s goal is “[t]o require non-Federal prison, correctional,
and detention facilities holding Federal prisoners or detainees under a
contract with the Federal Government to make the same information
available to the public that Federal prisons and correctional facilities are
required to make available.” 111 As of the summer of 2017, the bill has not
progressed beyond the initial introduction. 112 The bill was reintroduced to the
115th Congress, but also stalled after the introduction. 113 In sum, each bill
sought to make private prisons accountable to the public by expanding FOIA
to include private correctional facilities, but none of the bills enjoyed much
traction.
The PPIA has been vigorously opposed by private prison corporations, 114
and even by government entities. 115 CCA’s “federal lobbying disclosure
statements have specifically referenced lobbying related” to the bill. 116 In
fact, CCA alone spent millions of dollars in the last decade lobbying against

106. See Actions, H.R.2470–Private Prison Information Act of 2015, CONGRESS, https://www.c
ongress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2470/all-actions (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
107. See Actions, H.R.5838–Private Prison Information Act of 2014, CONGRESS, https://www.c
ongress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/5838/all-actions (last visited Sept. 22, 2017); Actions,
H.R.74–Private Prison Information Act of 2011, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112thcongress/house-bill/74/all-actions (last visited Sept. 22, 2017); Actions, H.R.2450–Prison
Information Act of 2009, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/245
0/all-actions (last visited Sept. 22, 2017); Actions, H.R.1889–Private Prison Information Act of
2007, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/110th-congress/house-bill/1889/all-actions;
Actions, H.R.1806–Private Prison Information Act of 2005, CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/109th-congress/house-bill/1806/all-actions (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
108. See Actions, H.R.1980–Private Prison Information Act of 2017, CONGRESS, https://www.c
ongress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1980/all-actions (last visited Sept. 22, 2017).
109. See Private Prison Information Act of 2006, S. 4031, 109th Cong. (2006).
110. See Private Prison Information Act of 2015, S. 3422, 114th Cong. (2016).
111. Id.
112. See Actions, S.3422–Private Prison Information Act of 2016, CONGRESS, https://www.c
ongress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/3422/all-actions (last visited Sept. 23, 2017).
113. See Actions, S.1728–Private Prison Information Act of 2017, CONGRESS, https://www.c
ongress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1728/all-actions (last visited Sept. 23, 2017).
114. See Pauly, supra note 4; see also Thompson, supra note 77.
115. See Det. Watch Network v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 215 F. Supp. 3d 256 (S.D.N.Y.
2016).
116. Private Prison Information Act Reintroduced in Congress with PLN’s Help, PRISON LEGAL
NEWS (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2015/mar/4/private-prison-informat
ion-act-reintroduced-congress-plns-help/ [hereinafter PRISON LEGAL NEWS].
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the passage of the PPIA. 117 News outlets have also reported that a number of
congressional members have purchased CCA’s and The GEO Group’s
stock. 118 This may explain why Congress has yet to pass the bill, especially
when assuming that subjecting private prisons to FOIA would result in the
outpouring of information that would be directly harmful to the industry, and
indirectly harmful to the members of Congress.
A. PRIVATE PRISONS AND STATE OPEN RECORD LAWS
In the face of such legislative opposition, state courts took action to
ensure that private prisons operating for state governments comply with the
state open record statutes. Particularly, in Times Publishing Company v.
Corrections Corporation of America, a Florida court concluded that because
the private prison in question is “performing an essentially governmental
function,” it is subject to Florida Public Records Act, 119 which is Florida’s
version of FOIA. In Friedmann v. CCA, Tennessee explicitly applied public
record statutes to private prisons stating that the court “is at a loss as to how
operating a prison could be considered anything less than a governmental
function.” 120
A Vermont court argued that permitting CCA to use its private actor
status as a shield from open record requests “would enable any public agency
to outsource its governmental duties to a private entity and thereby entirely
avoid, intentionally or unintentionally, the fundamental interests in
transparency and accountability that the Act is designed to protect and that
has become a normalized quality and function of government.” 121 Upon
being deemed “the functional equivalent of a governmental agency for public
records purposes and thus subject to the Public Records Act,” CCA “fully
cooperated with the request” and handed over the requested documents. 122
PLN, which was the propulsion behind many of these state suits, 123 also

117. See Thompson, supra note 77.
118. See Emma Baccellieri, Spotlight on Private Prisons, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Aug. 23,

2016), https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/08/spotlight-on-private-prisons-lobbying-and-othe
rwise/ (“Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine) and Rep. Bruce Westerman (R-Ark.) both own shares of
CCA, while Reps. Buddy Carter (R-Ga.) and Kenny Marchant (R-Texas) hold GEO Group
shares.”).
119. See Times Pub. Co. v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 91-429 CA 01, 1991 WL 384136, at *2 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 6, 1991).
120. Friedmann v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 539, *21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
5, 2009).
121. Prison Legal News v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 2014 Vt. Super. LEXIS 36, *9–10 (Vt. Super. Ct.
Jan. 10, 2014).
122. Prison Legal News v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 2015 Vt. Super. LEXIS 91, *1 (Vt. Super. Ct.
Sept. 1, 2015) (CCA initially withheld some documents that it believed were contractually protected
because they were “subject to confidentiality agreements with third parties who declined to waive
their rights.” The court reviewed the documents, made appropriate redaction, and released them to
the requesting party).
123. See E-mail from Alex Friedmann, supra note 103.
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succeeded in Texas courts when litigating against CCA for access to
information. 124
These courts have established a common pattern and set a strong
precedent among state courts. After the trilogy of successful cases in
Tennessee, Vermont, and Texas, PLN filed record requests in California and
New Mexico; CCA produced the records without the need for litigation. 125
B. WHY PRIVATE PRISONS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO FOIA
Private prisons should be subject to FOIA for a number of reasons: they
are funded primarily by taxpayer dollars, they perform an inherently
governmental function, and the government should not be permitted to
contract away its FOIA obligation.
It is no secret that government contracts funded by taxpayer dollars
contribute to the vast majority of the industry’s revenue. 126 For example, in
2015, taxpayers in Oklahoma paid CCA a hefty $2.3 million a month to run
its state prisons. 127 In 2015, taxpayers shed $1,339,474,186 in federal taxes
to fund The GEO Group, CCA, and MTC. 128 A joint letter submitted to
Representative Jackson Lee, expressing support for the PPIA, noted that “[i]f
private prison companies like CCA and [The] GEO [Group] would like to
continue to enjoy taxpayer-funded federal contracts, then they should adhere
to disclosure laws equivalent to those governing their public counterparts—
including FOIA.” 129 To function, private prison corporations must rely in
large part on taxpayer funds, and thus should be held to the same standards
as government prisons—requiring private prisons to answer to the very
people who fund them.
In accordance with the reasoning set forth in Times Publishing Company,
private prisons should also be subject to FIOA because they “perform the
124. See Mike Tartaglia, Private Prisons, Private Records, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1689, 1731 (2014).
125. See E-mail from Alex Friedmann, supra note 103 (Alex Friedmann articulated that he is not

sure whether case law can be directly attributed to the precedent courts set, but still notes that after
these cases, CCA provided requested documents without the need for litigation.).
126. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, BANKING ON BONDAGE: PRIVATE PRISONS AND MASS
INCARCERATION 5 (2011), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf.
127. Justin Glawe, America’s Biggest Private Prison Company Let Inmates Kill Each Other,
Lawsuit Claims, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 24, 2016, 1:03 AM), www.thedailybeast.com/articles/
2016/10/24/america-s-biggest-private-prison-company-let-inmates-kill-each-other-lawsuitclaims.html.
128. See Spending Map, USA SPENDING, https://www.usaspending.gov/Pages/AdvancedSearch
.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2017) (used the advanced search option; search criteria included the year
2015 only, all spending options checked, and the appropriate DUNS Number entered; search result
showed a total of 145 transactions amounting to $534,738,964 with CCA, DUNS Number
159734151; a total of 167 transactions amounting to $333,921,138 with The GEO Group, DUNS
Number 039203740; a total of 182 transactions amounting to $470,814,084 with MTC, DUNS
Number 039203740).
129. Letter from Human Rights Defense Center to U.S. Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (Dec. 18, 2012),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/private_prison_infor_act_sign_on_letter_final_jan2013.pdf
[hereinafter Letter from Human Rights Defense Center].
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inherently governmental function of incarceration.” 130 Private prisons
operate facilities that hold federal and state prisoners, ultimately curtailing
their right to the many freedoms enjoyed by others. Indeed, prisons “house a
uniquely powerless population.” 131 The sensitive function performed by
private prisons mandates the need for transparency and effective oversight,
which is made possible by the PPIA. As such, effective oversight involves
public disclosure, government action, and litigation. 132
By outsourcing correctional services to private entities, the government
should not be allowed to waive its obligations under FOIA. When the
government chooses to delegate its function to a private entity, it “frustrates
the purpose of the FOIA.” 133 “The fact that [a] governmental agency does not
control the information in a technical sense” does not make the argument for
greater transparency any less probative. 134 Following the reasoning presented
by the court in Prison Legal News v. Corrections Corporation of America, a
public entity should not be permitted to outsource its duty, thereby avoiding
“the fundamental interests in transparency and accountability.” 135 The point
is that “the government should not be able to contract away the public’s right
to know.” 136 Since these reasons alone are not likely to gain the attention of
the industry, this Note will suggest reasons that may be more persuasive.
IV. SAVING THE PRIVATE PRISON INDUSTRY: INCREASED
TRANSPARENCY
Capitalism dictates that business entities be held accountable by their
customers and consumers. Consumers have the power to change how they
interact with specific producers or service providers—should they become
unhappy with their products or performance. For example, if an investor is
not content with the way her stockbroker is handling her money, she is free
to take it elsewhere. The stockbroker likely does not want to lose business,
and so she will strive to better accommodate her clients by adjusting her
methods. This is free market capitalism; it encourages producers to alter their
means of production to better accommodate their consumers so that their
customers will not take their business elsewhere.
CCA believes that federal, state, and local governments choose “an
outsourced correctional service provider based primarily on availability of
beds, price, and the quality of services provided.” 137 Although this may
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

PRISON LEGAL NEWS, supra note 116.
David Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1453 (2010).
See id. at 1453–54, 1461–62.
Cdsarez, supra note 89, at 293.
Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An Analysis of Public
Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21, 62 (1999).
135. Prison Legal News v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 2014 Vt. Super. LEXIS 36, at *9–10 (Vt. Super.
Ct. Jan. 10, 2014).
136. PRISON LEGAL NEWS, supra note 116.
137. CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 21.

230

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 12

partially be so, when selecting which private prison entity to outsource to, the
government is unlike the broker’s client because it does not have many
options. Although the government may be influenced by its own perception
of private prisons, what holds more power in swaying the government in
selection and use of private prisons is public perception and the media. That
is where the PPIA comes in. With the correct public relations strategy, the
PPIA can strengthen the industry by rehabilitating confidences of the
industry’s customers, and by providing the means to inquire into and oversee
private prison operations.
CCA and The GEO Group both acknowledge how important it is for the
public and the government to perceive the industry with a positive attitude. 138
Both corporations also recognize the vital role governmental clients play in
the industry’s wellbeing. 139 Specifically, The GEO Group explains that its
“revenue base is derived from [their] long-term customer relationships.” 140
In a strikingly similar choice of words, in their Form 10-Ks, both CCA and
The GEO Group concede that the industry has not achieved complete
acceptance from either the government nor the public, and that negative
publicity about privately managed facilities makes it more difficult to
maintain existing contracts and attain new ones. 141 In yet another strikingly
similar choice of words, the two giants acknowledged that they depend on a
limited number of governmental customers for a significant portion of their
revenue, and that losing business with any one of their customers can cause
serious harm to the company’s wellbeing. 142 The GEO Group believes that
“public resistance to the use of public-private partnerships for correctional,
detention and community based facilities could result in [their] inability to
obtain new contracts or the loss of existing contracts, which could have a
material adverse effect on [the] business, financial condition and results of
operations.” 143
138.
139.
140.
141.

See generally id.; GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29.
See generally CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39; GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29.
GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29, at 9.
See CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 29–31(“The operation of correctional and
detention facilities by private entities has not achieved complete acceptance by either governments
or the public. . . . Further, negative publicity about an escape, riot or other disturbance or perceived
poor operational performance, contract compliance, or other conditions at a privately managed
facility may result in adverse publicity to us and the private corrections industry in general.”); see
also GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29, at 35 (the industry “has not achieved complete
acceptance by either government agencies or the public. . . . In addition, negative publicity about
conditions, an escape, riot or other disturbance at a facility operated under a public-private
partnership may result in adverse publicity to us and public-private partnerships in general.”).
142. See CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 34 (“[w]e depend on a limited number of
governmental customers for a significant portion of our revenues,” the loss of such customers “could
seriously harm our financial condition and results of operations”); see also GEO Group Form 10K, supra note 29, at 33 (“[w]e depend on a limited number of governmental customers for a
significant portion of our revenues. The loss of, or a significant decrease in revenues from, these
customers could seriously harm our financial condition and results of operations.”).
143. GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29, at 35.
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Shortly before the Obama administration DOJ announced its phase-out
initiative, CCA reported that “[t]he loss of, or a significant decrease in,
business from the BOP, ICE, USMS [U.S. Marshals Service], or various state
agencies could seriously harm [their] financial condition and results of
operations.” 144 CCA is not wrong. Should the next administration’s DOJ
follow in the footsteps of President Obama’s initiative and withdraw its use
of private correctional facilities, CCA stands to lose roughly 11%, or $190
million, of its yearly revenue. 145 Since The GEO Group’s business with the
DOJ amounts to 15.6% of its total consolidated revenue, they stand to lose
much more. 146 This revenue would no longer be there if the industry fails to
correct its ways. As public pressure continues to mount, should other federal,
state, or local governments implement what President Obama began when
his administration directed the BOP to begin the phase-out, the private prison
industry will continue to head toward its own demise.
Regardless of the new administration’s federal action or inaction, the
phase-out process may very well be implemented by state governments
because state outsourcing is independent from that of the DOJ. State
governments have not yet indicated that they too intend to limit and
eventually end outsourcing correctional services. Private prisons can prolong
the temporary status quo if they improve public and government perception,
which private prison corporations have acknowledged produces a direct
effect on revenues.
A. THE PPIA AS A SOLUTION
Improving public and government perception can be done by enacting
the PPIA, an Act which would allow private prisons to negate bad press
through increased transparency, and facilitate independent oversight that can
help move the industry back toward providing quality correctional services.
1. Transparency
Those who oppose the PPIA fail to acknowledge that building trust “has
always been the mark of a good business.” 147 In fact, effective transparency
is one of the tenets of corporate communication. 148 Howard Schultz, the CEO
of Starbucks, once said “the currency of leadership is transparency.” 149 When
144.
145.
146.
147.

CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 34.
Id.
GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29, at 34.
Himanshu Sareen, An Economy of Trust: How Transparency is Changing the Tech Industry,
WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2015/03/economy-trust-transparency-changing-tech-indu
stry/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2017).
148. See Nick Morgan, Is Corporate Transparency Always a Good Thing?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Oct. 17, 2008), available at https://hbr.org/2008/10/is-corporate-transparency-alwa.
149. The Openness Revolution, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 11, 2014, 2:14 PM), www.economist.co
m/news/business/21636070-multinationals-are-forced-reveal-more-about-themselves-whereshould-limits.
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it comes to public trust, missteps “can mean the difference between success
and failure.” 150 Transparency in the private prison world is equally important,
especially when the industry has faced a decline in confidence from both the
public and from its clients.
The Tylenol murders of 1982 are a great depiction of this concept. The
murders occurred in Chicago, where over the course of a few days seven
people died without apparent cause; the only link between the victims was
that they all had taken Extra-Strength Tylenol. 151 As the investigation
progressed, the ingested Tylenol was found to have been laced with a deadly
chemical. 152 Upon this revelation, Tylenol was pulled off store shelves. 153
Before the murders, Tylenol controlled over 35% of the over-the-counter
pain medication market. However, a few weeks after the deaths, Tylenol’s
market share fell below 8%. 154
The DOJ’s phase-out process is analogous to Tylenol being pulled from
store shelves, because both situations threatened the existence of the
corporation and called for the entities to respond promptly and
authoritatively. Johnson & Johnson, Tylenol’s manufacturer, took “an active
role with the media in issuing mass warning communications and
immediately called for a massive recall of the more than [thirty-one] million
bottles of Tylenol in circulation.” 155 It “reacted to the crisis swiftly and
decisively, launching a massive public relations campaign urging the public
not to use Tylenol.” 156 The company then pledged to the public that it would
work harder to protect consumers in the future. 157 Johnson & Johnson kept
its pledge by working with the Federal Department of Agriculture to create
tamper-proof packaging; the packaging later became an industry standard.158
As a result of Johnson & Johnson’s honest and open response, within a year
the company’s market share was back to where it had been before the 1982
murders. 159 Even critics who had “prematurely announced the death of the
brand Tylenol were now praising the company’s handling of the matter.” 160
Johnson & Johnson’s public relations campaign should serve as an example
to the private prison industry: handling a company crisis transparently and
150. Sareen, supra note 147.
151. See Dan Fletcher, A Brief History of the Tylenol Poisonings, TIME (Feb. 9, 2009),

http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1878063,00.html.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Howard Markel, How the Tylenol Murders of 1982 Changed the Way We Consume
Medication, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 29, 2014, 11:39 AM), www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/tylenolmurders-1982/.
155. Id.
156. The Tylenol Murders, HISTORY, www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-tylenol-murders
(last visited Aug. 15, 2017).
157. Markel, supra note 154.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Id.
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proactively, and ensuring healthy public relations, facilitates an opportunity
for the company to hold an open line of communication with its customers
and gain customers’ loyalty in return.
Because of the way Tylenol handled its brand’s crisis, Tylenol is still a
functioning and profitable business. On the other hand, companies that “were
less forthcoming, or even deceptive, in their dealings with the public,” are
not. 161 Enron, for example, a company that before its collapse “marketed
electricity and natural gas, delivered energy and other physical commodities,
and provided financial and risk management services to customers around
the world,” 162 was rated the sixth largest company in the world. 163 Upon
reports of fraud, it was revealed that Enron’s reported earnings had been
falsified. 164 Enron’s earnings reports falsely claimed revenue to be hundreds
of millions of dollars more than the company actually made. 165 In addition to
its financial collapse, the fraud led to the indictment and convictions of
sixteen former executives, including Enron’s chief executives. 166 Most
notably and for this Note’s purpose, Enron has since been labeled the poster
child for corporate indecency and dishonesty. 167 The company drowned in its
own mess, and endured what is a true nightmare for any corporation.
If the PPIA became law, it would extend FOIA to private prisons and
subsequently grant the public a right to demand greater transparency.
Journalists, advocates, and other interested parties would be able to request
information and avoid being guided solely by ongoing accusations of
inadequate management. If the facts reflect a different reality than that which
investigative reports have shown in the recent years, then the industry’s name
will be cleared of any wrongdoing or abuse. However, since the industry has
been reluctant to provide access to information, many believe that private
prisons have a lot to hide. If this is not the case, then the transparency,
inherent in the PPIA, would put the information needed to rebuild the
people’s trust in the industry directly into the people’s hands.
These two things, transparency and trust, support sustainable growth not
only because they reduce the need to make assumptions, but also because
“the fact that more people are more closely scrutinizing board behavior
161. Morgan, supra note 148.
162. Enron Fast Facts, CNN, www.cnn.com/2013/07/02/us/enron-fast-facts/ (last updated Apr.

17, 2017, 3:39 PM).
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See Alexei Barrionuevo, Two Enron Chiefs Are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy Trial,
N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/26/business/businessspecial3/26en
ron.html.
167. See Ken Silverstein, Enron, Ethics and Today’s Corporate Values, FORBES (May 14, 2013,
7:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/05/14/enron-ethics-and-todays-corpo
rate-values/#51b90b3e5ab8 (“‘Honesty’ and ‘decency’ have typically been applied in interpersonal
communications. But such characteristics can get lost during business dealings. Enron is the poster
child for such distorted behavior.”).
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encourages directors to be more responsible.” 168 Should transparency reveal
that the reality is as harsh as investigative reports have said it to be, embracing
the PPIA would demand that the industry engage effective, independent
oversight. That oversight could help to deliver on the industry’s promise to
provide meaningful correctional services, while not only saving the
government money, but also turning a profit.
2. Independent Oversight
A corporation’s duty is to safeguard the interests of all shareholders so
that long term sustainability can be ensured. 169 The financial crisis of 2008
exposed weaknesses at all levels of corporate governance, and tarnished
corporate reputations. 170 Negative impacts caused by the financial crisis have
been felt by all, from the average household to shareholders and corporate
executives. Thus, today, stakeholders are focused on the importance of
effective corporate oversight, and are demanding that oversight be improved
so that shareholders can be provided with greater protection and be assured
that their investments are safe. 171 Considering the investigatory reports and
the DOJ’s phase-out announcement, it would not be surprising to find
shareholders in the private prison industry reacting similarly. It is in the
investors’ best interest to ensure that the industry thrives beyond the Trump
administration. To do so, the industry needs to win back government and
public acceptance, which can be accomplished through the PPIA, an Act that
would allow public interest groups to engage in independent industry
oversight.
Justice Louis Brandeis once said that “sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants.” 172 “Prison transparency allows for many opportunities for
improvement to occur,” but “awareness without action is meaningless in the
context of the prison.” 173 Prison oversight is “in the best interests of
everyone,” including correctional leadership. 174 The media, watchdog
organizations, interested citizenry, and other advocacy organizations have
traditionally acted as independent overseers in this area by utilizing public
168. Id.; see also Corporate Transparency: Why Honesty is the Best Policy, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 4, 2014, 7:39 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/corporate-transpare
ncy-honesty-best-policy.
169. See Sean Lyons, Corporate Oversight and Stakeholder Lines of Defense Stakeholders
Demand a Critical Review of Corporate Oversight, EXECUTIVEACTION SERIES 1 (Oct. 2011).
170. See id. at 1; see also Nathaniel Parish Flannery, Recent Scandals Highlight the Importance
of Effective Board Oversight, FORBES (July 7, 2011, 1:56 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielpa
rishflannery/2011/07/07/recent-scandals-highlight-the-importance-of-effective-boardoversight/#7e641e4353c5 (“A number of recent cases of corporate fraud and misconduct suggest
that companies may not be doing enough to promote effective board oversight.”).
171. See Lyons, supra note 169, at 1.
172. Stan Stojkovic, Overview of Correctional Oversight: Prison Oversight and Prison
Leadership, 30 PACE L. REV. 1476, 1478 (2010) (internal citation omitted).
173. Id. at 1479.
174. Id. at 1476.
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record laws to gain access to operational information related to the
industry. 175 It is no question that disclosure of information can be used as a
“powerful tool for advocacy” and that “the lack of useful data reduces the
accountability of prison companies.” 176 Public scrutiny is often a prerequisite
for changing harmful practices. 177 “The presence of the civilian overseer
keeps professional administrators at the top of their game,” 178 serving the
benefit of all, including the corporation and its shareholders.
Currently, however, these advocates do not have access to information
about the “shadow world” within which private prisons operate. 179 This lack
of access prevents the public and advocacy groups from engaging in
oversight and inhibits the means through which the industry can regain the
government’s and the public’s confidence. Without rehabilitating said
confidence, the industry impedes its chances of thriving beyond the Trump
administration. Given the opportunity, there are many independent advocacy
groups that would relish the chance to help private prisons ensure that they
are meeting expectations. By requiring transparency, the PPIA provides a
route to ensuring that private prisons are effectively monitored. 180
3. Corporate Interest and Duty
Private prisons’ duties are not limited to keeping inmates in humane
conditions nor to providing meaningful correctional services. By virtue of
their corporate status, they also have a fiduciary duty to their investors, a duty
that requires industry actors to act in the investors’ best interest. 181 There is
no dispute that courts will enforce this duty, should it be breached. 182
Investigative reports that alleged cost-cutting, which subsequently resulted in
gross violations of prisoners’ rights, combined with the industry’s sheltered
response, fashion a poisonous concoction that can be viewed as a violation
of the corporation’s fiduciary duty to its shareholders. It is a violation because
the industry’s questionable actions and the subsequent sheltered response
clearly does not and will not uphold the duties the industry owes to its
shareholders in pursuing its primary business strategy of increasing
occupancy and revenue. Through the PPIA, the industry can work to negate
175. See Tartaglia, supra note 124, at 1691.
176. Hartney & Glesmann, supra note 30, at 25; see also Stojkovic, supra note 172, at 1480

(“transparency allows outside people to see correctional operations and to comment on their
appropriateness”); John Brickman, The Role of Civilian Organizations with Prison Access and
Citizen Members – The New York Experience, 30 PACE L. REV. 1562, 1571 (2010) (“[w]atching
something affects its course”).
177. Geraghty & Velez, supra note 95, at 455.
178. Brickman, supra note 176, at 1569.
179. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 354–55 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. See Tartaglia, supra note 124, at 1691–92.
181. See Robert A. Kutcher, Breach of Fiduciary Duties, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 3–4,
apps.americanbar.org/abastore/products/books/abstracts/5310344_chap1_abs.pdf.
182. See id. at 4.
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the obviously destructive effects caused by bad press, and engage in proactive
public relations by allowing for greater disclosure, and effective and
independent oversight.
Effective public relations strategies are crucial to the success of any
industry. Both CCA and The GEO Group admit that neither their
governmental clients nor the public has accepted the industry. 183 The GEO
Group voices concerns that public resistance of private correctional facilities
negatively affects its ability to renew old contracts or acquire new ones. 184
Nevertheless, private prisons refuse to provide access to information and
choose to litigate against such disclosure, single-handedly causing the public
to perceive the industry as being exceptionally secretive 185 and “legally
immune to open-records requests.” 186
Unlike their government counterparts, private prisons are not required to
report on the inmates they house, nor do they make information easily
accessible to monitors. 187 In fact, private prisons may not even be “aware of
the documentation and reporting requirements intrinsic to the operation of
public agencies.” 188 Thus, “oversight and monitoring has [] proven to be
difficult and tends to be lax and ineffective.” 189 Several states have found
poor contract performance to be caused by lack of transparency, which has
created obstacles in the way of effective enforcement and oversight of
contract satisfaction. 190 The result is a powerful industry that “flourish[es] in
the shadows,” 191 and an industry that attempts to meet its interests by
minimizing disclosure of information that may paint it in a negative light,192
or any light at all for that matter. Such secrecy feeds into the popular belief
that prisons are an inherently bad place. This does not have to be so. Private
prisons have the capacity to deliver on their promise to provide adequate
correctional services, and to save the government money. This, however,
cannot be achieved without allowing for greater disclosure, increased
transparency, and independent oversight.

183. See CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 29–31; see also GEO Group Form 10-K, supra
note 29, at 35.
184. See CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 29–31; see also GEO Group Form 10-K, supra
note 29, at 35.
185. See Bauer, supra note 5; see also Letter from Human Rights Defense Center, supra note 130
(writing that the Human Rights Defense Center is “deeply troubled by the secrecy with which the
private corrections industry presently operates”).
186. Park, supra note 96.
187. See Hartney & Glesmann, supra note 30, at 15.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Tartaglia, supra note 124, at 1702.
191. Tom Barry, The Shadow Prison Industry and Its Government Enablers, CTR. FOR INT’L
POL’Y (Apr. 30, 2010), https://www.ciponline.org/research/html/shadow-prison-industry-gover
nment-enablers; see also Hartney & Glesmann, supra note 30, at 15.
192. See Hartney & Glesmann, supra note 30, at 15–16.
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Finally, if private prisons are not persuaded by the arguments above, they
should be persuaded by the fact that their own secrecy has prevented growth
in every aspect in which a business usually hopes to develop. When the DOJ
announced its intent to begin phasing-out of outsourcing correctional duties,
shares of CCA plummeted 35% and shares of The GEO Group fell 40%. 193
That same day, Market Watch reported that “the selloff may be an
overreaction,” correctly noting that this decision only affected a portion of
privately run facilities because the DOJ’s decision had no effect on states’
policies. 194 Nevertheless, should the industry continue to lurk in the shadows,
public advocacy groups will not cease their tireless efforts to pressure the
federal, state, and local governments to follow the DOJ’s precedent and end
their relationship with the industry.
4. Current Oversight of Private Prisons is Inadequate
An argument against the need for transparency and public accountability
is that because the government employs private prisons, the government “can
exercise power over the kind and level of services to be provided and at what
cost,” 195 which arguably works to ensure adequate performance. However,
this argument is flawed. “A trove of 20,000 pages of previously unreleased
monitoring reports, internal investigations, and other documents obtained
through an open-records suit show that the BOP had been warned of
substandard care by its own monitors for years but failed to act.” 196 This
finding alone debunks the idea that government oversight is enough to
compel the private prison industry to conduct its business in a contractually
adequate manner.
The state outsourcing experience is not all that different from that of
federally outsourced facilities: scores of states have found contract
deficiencies. 197 For example, in 2010 the Idaho Department of Corrections
(IDOC) officials believed that a CCA Idaho Correctional Center (ICC) was
taking all the steps necessary to comply with its contract, only to learn that
ICC had been falsifying staffing numbers, and, in effect, defrauding
taxpayers. 198 The facility even had its own IDOC contract monitor who failed
to notice, or chose not to address, the falsified staffing reports. 199 In response,
193. See Wallace Witkowski, Privately-Run Prison Stocks Gutted as Justice Department Plans
to Phase Out Use, MARKET WATCH (Aug. 18, 2016, 6:14 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/sto
ry/private-prison-stocks-gutted-as-justice-department-plans-to-phase-out-use-2016-08-18.
194. See id.
195. DOUGLAS MCDONALD & CARL PATTEN, GOVERNMENTS’ MANAGEMENT OF PRIVATE
PRISONS xxv (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/203968.pdf.
196. Wessler, supra note 70.
197. See Tartaglia, supra note 124, at 1702.
198. See Associated Press, Staffing Issues Known for Years at Idaho’s Private Prison, BOISE
STATE PUB. RADIO (Oct. 23, 2013), http://boisestatepublicradio.org/post/staffing-issues-known-yea
rs-idahos-private-prison#stream/0.
199. See id.
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an IDOC Quality Assurance Manager stated that “[n]ever in a million years
did we think they were lying to us.” 200 CCA’s contract with ICC was
automatically terminated and Idaho sought bids from other private providers
to take over the facility. 201 Ultimately, most of the state’s Democratic
representatives urged Idaho to remove ICC from private hands and put it back
under state management. 202 Interestingly, the letter containing these views
was delivered by Republicans, not Democrats. 203 ICC, which was the biggest
prison in the state, reverted to being a government-run prison, which resulted
in CCA losing an annual $29 million dollar contract. 204 This loss of revenue
is due to the inadequate performance of IDOC monitoring procedures that
failed to notice evidence of fraud. If advocacy groups had access to facility
information, they would either have been able to notify IDOC of the
deficiencies earlier, or would have pressured CCA to act accordingly.
Private prison contracts are often regulated through standards created by
organizations like the American Correctional Association (ACA) or National
Commission on Correctional Healthcare (NCCHC). 205 In fact, all private
prison facilities must be accredited in order to continue their operations. 206
Public prisons, on the other hand, are not required to achieve accreditation
from either ACA nor NCCHC, but may seek to do so voluntarily. 207
Accreditation, however, offers quite a deceptive perception of quality. For
one, the process does not require actual, extensive observation of the facilities
or even contact with prisoners. 208 Since audits are scheduled in advance, 209
corporations like CCA or The GEO Group are given ample time to cover up
all the things they do not want auditors to see, and to present accreditors with
a false reality.

200. Id.
201. See Tartaglia, supra note 124, at 1702.
202. See Rebecca Boone, Dems to Idaho Prisons Board: Let State Run ICC, MAGIC VALLEY

(Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.magicvalley.com/news/local/dems-to-idaho-prisons-board-let-state-ru
n-icc/article_cdf9be4e-35d4-11e3-ba41-001a4bcf887a.html.
203. Idaho Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter’s spokesman, Mark Warbis, delivered the letter.
“Warbis said there was no ‘hidden message’ to Otter’s decision to deliver the Democrats’ message
to the board.” Id. This is interesting because it depicts that the Republicans, who would typically be
for private prisons and for less disclosure, were actually acting in concert with the Democrats, thus
cleverly depicting their support for removing the prison from the private industry.
204. See Associated Press, Board: Idaho Can Start Taking Over Private Prison, IDAHO NEWS
(Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.kboi2.com/news/local/board-idaho-can-start-taking-over-privateprison.
205. Tartaglia, supra note 124, at 1700.
206. See David W. Miller, The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization: An
Analysis of State Correctional Systems, PROQUEST SOC. SCI. DISCOVERY GUIDE 6 (2010), http://w
ww.antoniocasella.eu/nume/miller_2010.pdf.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 7.
209. See id.
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Accreditors’ primary source of income are the fees paid to them by those
they investigate. 210 As such, it would not be in the auditors’ interest to judge
private prisons too harshly because that would result in unsatisfied clients.
On July 9, 2010, CCA announced that five of its facilities had been
reaccredited by the ACA, but what it failed to mention was that it cost CCA
a hefty $22,500 to attain what CCA termed its “stamp of approval.” 211 If the
auditor acted in a way that would displease their client it is unlikely that the
client would engage with the auditor again. In the circumstance of the CCA’s
engagement with ACA, ACA would lose $22,500 in revenue next time CCA
needs an accreditation. This is precisely why the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX) was enacted—as a response to major corporate and financial scandals
such as Enron. 212 The SOX encourages engagement of independent auditors
to ensure unbiased, uninfluenced audits. 213
The way the accreditation process is structured presents not only a clear
conflict of interest, but a lack of effectiveness; thus, it fails to prevent the
industry from cutting too many corners. Additionally, current governmental
oversight is inadequate, and private prisons are left to do as they wish, as
opposed to doing what they are contractually obligated to do.
CONCLUSION
Private prisons perform a “hugely important and difficult undertaking:
ensuring the humane treatment of prisoners, carrying out the rule of law, and
preserving safety in the facilities.” 214 Private prison corporations recognize
that the industry is hurt by negative press, and by the fact that neither the
government nor the public has accepted it. 215 Private prison entities also place
great importance on their clients because the nature of the business does not
leave the industry with many clients to appeal to. 216 The industry was shaken
to its core when the Obama administration’s DOJ found that private prisons
do not provide a meaningful, nor acceptable, correctional service, and
subsequently announced that it would cease contract renewal and ultimately
210. See id.
211. See Press Release, Private Corrections Institute, CCA Pays Over $22,000 to American

Correctional Association to Claim “Stamp of Approval” at Five Private Prisons (July 9, 2010),
available at http://ww1.prweb.com/prfiles/2010/07/09/3673404/PCIpressreleasereCCAaccreditati
on2.pdf.
212. See Gretchen Morgenson, Sarbanes-Oxley, Bemoaned as a Burden, Is an Investor’s Ally,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/08/business/sarbanes-oxley-investo
rs.html.
213. See Audit Committees and Auditor Independence, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/audit042707.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2017) (“[A]n
auditor’s independence is impaired if the auditor is not . . . capable of exercising objective and
impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within the audit engagement.”).
214. Hartney & Glesmann, supra note 30, at 26.
215. See CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39, at 29–31; see also GEO Group Form 10-K, supra
note 29, at 35.
216. See generally CCA 2015 Form 10-K, supra note 39; GEO Group Form 10-K, supra note 29.
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seek to end prison outsourcing. Should the industry continue to lurk in the
shadows, both the federal government’s and the public’s perceptions of
private prisons will continue to deteriorate. In turn, this will make the
industry’s clients question whether they too should end outsourcing to private
prisons.
While the industry is currently enjoying the policies set forth by the
Trump administration, it is important to keep in mind that this administration
is not permanent, and that this grace period should not be wasted on ill
intentions, but rather should be used to improve industry standards,
implement methods that allow for greater transparency, and restore the
government’s and the public’s trust. Should this grace period be spent in vain,
there is no telling how the next administration, or state and local
governments, will address the prolonged issues currently faced by the private
prison industry. There is, however, Sally Yates’ initiative to begin phasingout and ultimately ending outsourcing of correctional services to private
entities that most definitely will be used as an example.
Enacting the PPIA will lead to increased transparency, which can help
the industry combat bad press and improve public relations. The PPIA will
facilitate access to information that is necessary for effective, independent
oversight. Through such independent oversight, the industry can provide the
means with which to win back the federal government’s and the public’s
acceptance. By regaining this acceptance, the industry can strengthen its
presence, prevent another phase-out, and ensure continuity of its existence.
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